My Cybersecurity course has a lot of technical detail. Maybe not as much as some students wish, at least in certain topics, but finding the appropriate balance between breadth and depth is difficult. I try to convey to students an important message, though: in order to understand the dynamics of cybersecurity in the real world (" why we are still not applying fundamental principles formulated 50 years ago? ", " why there are so many vulnerabilities? ", " why such an obvious defense is not ubiquitous? "), one must never think solely in technical terms or even worse, in moral terms (" you have to make sure that your code does not have any vulnerabilities, otherwise you will be a sinner and go to hell!", " company X is evil because does not release patches for its vulnerable software! "). What I tell to students is that one must always think in economical terms ( "yes, this defense is interesting...but what is its cost in terms of f...
I have recently read in a newspaper the claim " once quantum computers are sufficiently advanced, they will render current cybersecurity technologies completely ineffective ". As a civil servant "sufficiently expert" in this field, I feel it is my duty to point out that this claim is deeply wrong. I will do so at least in this web blog. Quantum computers and Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) Once so-called ‘ quantum computers ’ become available in practice, they will be capable of breaking certain cryptographic algorithms that have been widely used for many years and are still used today. For this reason, for years now, there has been a huge push worldwide to accelerate the transition to so-called ‘post-quantum cryptography’ (PQC): cryptographic algorithms that can be executed by the standard computers we already have today , but which cannot be ‘decrypted’ even by the quantum computers of the future . Various PQC algorithms have already been developed and standardise...